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Strategic mobility is divided into three basic elements:
airlift, sealift, and the prepositioning of supplies and
equipment. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is
responsible for sealift and plays a major role in
prepositioning ships and equipment. Through its programs,
MSC provides flexibility and increased readiness to strate-
gic mobility. This thesis discusses many interrelated
sealift problems: labor and market vagaries, changing ship
types and containerization, the changing nature of ports,
deregulation and A-76 legislation, the decreasing U.S.
merchant fleet, and the struggling shipbuilding industry.
MSC's new tactics for strategic sealift, prepositioned ships
and fast sealift support, better approach the intent of the
national strategy to have surge capability and sustainabili-
ty in fighting a war.
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An infant United States quickly learned that
transportation control was its key to success. The enemy,
simply by blocking foreign trading vessels or by preventing
local supplies from being shipped by water to the areas
where they were needed, could win every war. Land forms of
transportation were almost nonexistent then, but were
quickly developed, along with the nation's sea strength.
Transportation became a doubly important factor: both
commerce and military strength depended heavily on adequate
and timely transportation.
By the time of the Mexican-American and Civil Wars,
ocean and contract freighting abounded. Railroads were also
beginning to play a major role in the shipment of goods. A
Merchant Marine force was thriving. The Spanish-American
War, our first entirely overseas war, still emphasized the
necessity of good planning for both transportation modes and
facilities. The railroads could move men and supplies
quickly over inland routes, but lack of adequate port
facilities caused huge backups and slow service in the
supply chain.
By World War I, competition between railroads caused the
federal government to seize control of the railroad industry
to ensure proper support of the war effort. In the end this
proved not to be a cost efficient operation, although it did
provide the most expedient movement of troops and supplies.
Also during this time the trucking industry began to
grow rapidly despite strict gasoline rationing. This
industry served some of the civilian population's growing
transportation needs. The truck's military usefulness was
additionally widely recognized and welcomed for its great
versatility, especially in the battlefield where most
"roadways" were either destroyed or nonexistent. With World
War II came confirmation of the importance and usefulness of
airlift as a form of transportation, although sealift was
then and still is recognized as the most important
transportation method during mobilization. The tremendous
volume required to support deployed forces can only be
supplied by sealift.
Prior to World War I the United States was an isolation-
ist nation. By World War II, however, the United States had
become a world leader, and since then has committed its
military forces to various different security objectives
worldwide. Strategic mobility provides the means to move
people, supplies, and equipment to wartime locations;
provides continuing support; and allows for the vagaries of




The Department of Defense divides its strategic mobility
forces into three basic elements: airlift, sealift, and the
prepositioning of supplies and equipment. The Military
Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for sealift, and also
plays a major role in the prepositioning of ships and
equipment
.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH
The general area of research is the Military Sealift
Command, its mission and goals, and factors affecting
strategic sealift. Recent changes in the size and configur-
ation of the U.S. merchant fleet affecting MSC's ability to
provide strategic sealift are considered in this thesis. In
addition, factors such as deregulation, A-76 legislation,
and the changing nature of ports and shipbuilding are
reviewed to determine their effect on MSC's ability to meet
its goals.
C. SCOPE
This thesis concentrates on specific changes and
influences occurring in the last ten to fifteen years.
Cargo and special mission components of MSC, although
related, are not discussed as they are not specifically part
of the concept of strategic sealift.
9
D. ORGANIZATION - -:-- .
Each chapter of the thesis will address separate factors
relating to MSC's mission accomplishment, beginning with a
description of MSC and its responsibilities. ^ ? : . ; _
E. APPENDICES '-''-
Appendices A through N provide information related to
MSC operations.
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II. THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND fMSC)
A. MISSION ze-^-: :. - _ . -
The primary mission of the Military Sealift Command is
to provide sealift for strategic mobility in support of
national security objectives. This strategic sealift
requires MSC to maintain the ability to deploy and sustain
military forces and equipment wherever and whenever needed,
as quickly and for as long as needed. MSC operates
worldwide, providing services for all elements of the
Department of Defense (DOD) . In addition to strategic
sealift, MSC is also responsible for Naval Fleet Auxiliary
Force (NFAF) operations, special mission support, and DOD
shipping operations, MSC uses government owned ships, books
space on scheduled commercial liners, and charters
commercial ships. DOD Instruction 5160.10, entitled Single
Manager Assignment of Ocean Transportation, establishes
command responsibilities and provides policy guidance
concerning MSC relationships with the customers it serves
and with Navy officials to whom the MSC Commander reports.
[Ref. 1]
B. TWO FLEETS
MSC supports its mission by running two fleets: its own
fleet consisting of U.S. -government-owned ships and a fleet
consisting of ships in the U.S. Merchant Marine. During
11
peacetime, MSC provides seal ift in its own vessels or in
ships it charters from private owners. Most shipping is
done by merchant ships, except for a small amount that is
carried on government vessels. During wartime, however, the
fleet of merchant vessels under MSC control grows
significantly. Additionally, ships in the ready reserve, or
"mothballs," also come under MSC control. This helps
maintain the sealift capacity so vital to our national
defense. At the end of fiscal year 1984, MSC controlled a
total of 132 ships, five of which are ships not in active
operation. A breakdown of ships controlled, by type, as
given by the MSC 1984 Annual Report [Ref. l:p. 25] is shown
in Table 1.
The 74 total nucleus ships represent 56 percent of the
total active MSC controlled fleet, but only a very small
portion of military cargo—less than 5 percent in FY84— is
carried by government owned ships, and that is expected to
drop further as government owned dry cargo ships are placed
in reserve status [Ref. l:p. 14]. This worldwide decline in
available dry cargo vessels is increasingly problematic for
MSC, as military cargo oftentimes doesn't fit into
containers. Further, containerships rely increasingly on
pierside cranes for loading and unloading. Placing dry
cargo (self-supporting break bulk) ships into reserve status
is one way MSC hopes to counteract sealift problems during a




(AS OF 30 SEP 84)
MSC Nucleus 74 (5)
Cargo
Break Bulk 2 (1)
RO/RO 2 (1)
Petroleum (including Bareboat Charters) 12 (1)
Special Mission Support 18 (1)
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 32 (1)
Rapid Deployment Force 7




Special Mission Support 5
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 1
Rapid Deployment Force 18
General Agency Agreement 3
TOTAL MSC CONTROLLED 132 (5)
Note: Figures in parentheses, included in totals, represent
nucleus ships not in active operation, i.e.,
activating, inactivating, phasedown, ready reserve,
converting, and modification.
C. NAVAL FLEET AUXILIARY FORCE (NFAF)
Operating the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) is also
one of MSC's primary missions. The NFAF directly supports
U.S. Navy ships at sea worldwide. This force is crewed by
Civil Service mariners (CIVMARs) supported by small military
detachments providing communications, ordnance handling, and
assistance during helicopter operations. Underway
replenishments, towing, salvage, and cable-laying and repair
are a few of the services provided to the fleet. NFAF ships
13
sail successfully with all U.S. Naval fleets, allowing
military operations to continue over longer periods and
greater distances than was previously possible.' '
D. PREPOSITIONING AND FAST SEALIFT SUPPORT - .- - 1 - r I 7 .. . _
The Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) was begun in
1980 to place sealift capability in areas otherwise
difficult to support. NTPF ships are frequently part of
convoy exercises and also support other joint U.S. -foreign
team exercises. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
program dedicates fully loaded mobile maritime prepositioned
ships to Marine Corps' usage. Most of these ships are new
or converted roll on/roll off (RO/RO) type ships and are
operated for MSC under long-term charters to U.S. flag
operating firms. These ships are also crewed by a civilian
force. The Fast Sealift Support (FSS) program purchased
high-speed SL-7 class containerships and converted them to
RO/RO usage. These ships are maintained in a status that
allows them to be fully activated within 96 hours. In
addition, they are activated for approximately 3 days each
year for training purposes, and participate in U.S. Naval
fleet exercises during that time. The FSS ships are viewed
as second-wave support for equipment lift in a crisis, and
their speed of over 3 knots represents a tremendous
enhancement of sealift capability. [Ref. l:p. 22]
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III. LABOR AND MARKET VAGARIES -
A. CIVILIAN LABOR AND UNIONS - --'-'-'- - -
One of the greatest problems MSC faces is civil ian
labor, as the costs have greatly increased with cost-of-
living increases and union-gained concessions from
management. It is labor cost that has caused U.S. merchant
vessel owners to give serious thought to alternative flag
registry, for American crews cost so much more than many
foreign crews that the cost of running the ship under the
U.S. flag is much higher. It is the cost of labor, too,
which has been cited as the reason for the demise of the
U.S. shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding is a labor
intensive industry, and so a substantial portion of any
total cost savings must come from lower wage rates, fewer
man-hours to build a ship, or both [Ref. 2:p. 95].
With high labor costs for both ship construction and
ship operation, it is no wonder that fewer vessel owners
choose U.S. registry. This, in turn, creates a bigger
problem: as the number of ships being built in U.S.
shipyards declines, the labor skills needed for shipbuilding
also decline, ultimately raising the costs of maintaining
the necessary skill levels. Similarly, the available pool
of mariners is declining because there are few jobs
requiring their skills. [Ref. 2: p. 98] Labor unions for
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both mariners and shipyard workers, as well as for
longshoremen and other associated workers, constantly strive
to protect their members' salaries, unfortunately oftentimes
to the ruin of their members when high salary costs cause a
reduction in employment.
While employers are trying to cut costs and seek new
ways to improve their standing in the competitive world
market if only to remain an operating (and employing) com-
pany, unions resist efforts to cut salaries or hours or
benefits, often crippling the employers and sometimes bring-
ing about the closing of the company. Japanese strategies,
in contrast, cut corporate dividends first, reduce salaries
and bonuses of top management next, and only as a last
resort cut pay or reduce hours in the workforce [Ref. 2:p.
97]. This is one reason foreign shipyards have been so
successful while U.S. shipyards have been slowly dying.
Labor costs, however, are not an employer's biggest
worry: there is always doubt about whether civilian workers
will strike. Although contracts are written with clauses
covering this contingency, it seems just the thought of a
strike is powerful enough to make this issue one bordering
on hysteria. Recently MSC was the victim of a strike when
one of its contract companies had a disagreement with its
labor union:
An American merchant marine master lost his license in a
non-criminal proceeding on 13 November 1985 after the U.S.
Coast Guard charged him with the ancient crime of
barratry—the use of a ship against an owner's interest.
16
Captain Paul Giachetti of Springfield, Pennsylvania,
denied the charge and appealed the conviction, stating
that he was caught in the middle of a labor dispute in
- which the Coast Guard had no jurisdiction. Giachetti was
master on the Mormacstar . a civilian manned tanker serving
as fresh water carrier for the Military Sealift Command's
near term prepositioning force off Diego Garcia in October
-1984 when his union, the Masters, Mates, and Pilots, and
his company, Moore McCormack Bulk Transport, failed to
reach an agreement on a new contract. The company, citing
court labor law decisions, said that officers are
supervisory personnel and that the company therefore was
no longer recognizing the union. Giachetti was offered a
company contract that was considerably less advantageous
to him than the union contract. The union told him to go
on strike, and when asked, told him that the Coast Guard
historically steers clear of moving against licenses for
issues arising during labor disputes. Giachetti told the
Military Sealift Command that he would sail in a national
emergency and would maintain the safety of the ship. He
refused to sail when ordered out on routine maneuvers. A
Coast Guard administrative judge hearing the case later
ruled that Giachetti endangered national security by
sacrificing the readiness of the near-term prepositioning
force. He also sacrificed company interests because the
ship was placed off charter. [Ref. 3:p. 64]
This example is especially important when one considers that
MSC relies heavily on a civilian workforce: of its 6,652
employees reported in 1984, only 743 were military [Ref.
l:p. 34].
B. MARKET PROBLEMS
The high cost of labor also figures in market costs.
American shipping companies must compete in a world that
includes fleets either partially or fully subsidized by
their foreign governments. Private carriers compete
fiercely among themselves for market share, but when a
government subsidizes its fleet, enabling it to offer prices
below cost, other carriers are no longer able to compete
17
equally. If newly developing countries continue to demand
more than their share of the market and communist fleets
continue to bid below cost, many Western private carriers
may be forced out of business entirely, [Ref. 2:p. 130}
High labor costs obviously do nothing to help the situation
for American companies. To help our fleet compete in this
market, the United States pays an operating-differential
subsidy (ODS) to qualified U.S. flag vessels. The ODS is
administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) , which
reported a subsidy outlay of $384.3 million during FY 1984
[Ref. 4:p. 9]. The ODS offsets certain lower ship operating
costs of foreign flag competitors and uses an index computed
annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for wage rates.
MARAD also considers maintenance and repair, hull and
machinery insurance, and protection and indemnity insurance
when applying subsidy rates. Not all vessels are eligible
for the ODS, however, and even those that do qualify are
still hard pressed to show a profit. The subsidy may simply
be prolonging eventual industry death. [Ref. 2:p. 102]
Another problem is the changing size of the shipping
fleet. Breakbulk cargo ships are being replaced by
containerships; tankers are being replaced by huge super-
tankers. [Ref. 3:p. 316] Although these huge supertankers
are more recently being replaced by smaller tankers, the
tankers of today are still larger than those operating in
the fleet ten years ago. Hence, where once there were many
18
smaller vessels competing for trade there are now fewer, but
much larger, vessels competing in the same market. [Ref
.
:3:p. 316] The larger vessels may in fact save Tabor because
of smaller crews, but other things equal, they cost more
waiting for a "full load." -" ^ :: -.
These larger vessels also created additional problems in
terms of overcapacity. There is an overcapacity available
which even a decline in world-wide fleet size fails to
amend
:
Between mid-1983 and mid-1984, the world merchant fleet of
ships over 100 gross register tons (grt) declined,
according to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, from 422.6
million to 418.7 million grt. This positive fall of
nearly 1 percent brings the total fleet in tonnage terms
to a level below that recorded in mid-1980, but although
this decline coincided with the first increase in world
seaborne trade since 1979 . .
.
, the fleet is still much
larger than is required to undertake the trade available
for it. By comparison with 1979, a year in which, even
then, there was substantial overcapacity, the ratio of
demand to supply has fallen by nearly a quarter. As a
result, the surplus of tonnage, which had characterised
world shipping since the mid-seventies, continued to
prevail. [Ref. 5: p. 52]
Overcapacity is something our seal ift strategy almost
demands, for overcapacity indicates an ability to provide
capability for surge. It is also, however, a problem for
the private shipping line whose interest is primarily
profit, because it has never been made clear just who should
pay for this overcapacity. Larger vessels are a profit-
seeking company's solution to its high cost problem, but
larger vessels may be a poorer solution in terms of
strategic sealift. This is one of the many reasons that the
19
NDRF includes more general cargo vessels than other types in
its total reserve. - -
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IV. CHANGING SHIP TYPES AND CONTAINERIZATION
A. CHANGING SHIP TYPES
Once vessel owners responded to the changing labor
market and other market problems by changing the size or
configuration of their ships, the very nature of the U.S.
fleet changed. Larger ships, equipped with the latest
technology, were less costly to run. Moreover, the high
cost of fuel made one large transfer more economical than
several smaller ones. Just recently, however, lower fuel
costs have allowed the smaller, but faster, breakbulk ships
to survive a bit longer. In addition, some types of cargo
are better suited for breakbulk delivery, and some ports are
better able to handle smaller vessels. The technology
making supertankers possible has yet to fit that tanker into
port: instead, these huge tankers anchor outside a port and
have smaller vessels perform loading/unloading. [Ref. 5:p.
50]
The U.S. merchant fleet, like other world fleets, is
gradually moving away from breakbulk cargo ships to
intermodal vessels such as containerships and from smaller
tankers to the giant supertankers. To compete in the world
market, the U.S. merchant fleet seeks to use the same
technology and advantages as do its rivals. But such
technology can make mobilization more difficult. If the
21
specialized equipment needed to unload these ships isn't
availcUDle everywhere, then the ships will be of little use
in the long run. Huge tankers may not be useful during
wartime because their size may make them more -vulnerable to
attack, potentially slower, or less able to" use the best
ports
.
Strategic sealift suffers from inadequate availability
of vessels to dedicate to any mobilization effort and from
slow production when once new vessels are contracted for.
This combination of inadequate resources and slow production
creates a real problem for sealift that technology can only
partially alleviate. MSC's purchases of vessels for the
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) help keep the right mix of vessels available
for any contingency. [Ref. l:p. 40]
B. CONTAINERIZATION
Containerization has had a major impact on strategic
sealift because container shipping is rapidly replacing
breakbulk shipping. Unfortunately, military cargoes are
better suited for breakbulk shipping. The high cost of
labor in the U.S. helped containerization gain a strong
foothold; its rapid ship loading and unloading made it
feasible. Containers are immensely practical when loaded
directly from ship to rail car (or vice versa) at a
terminal. The intermodal mixing, accessibility, and
standardization obtained through containerization are other
22
important factors for mobilization. Transportation modes
have more flexibility and greater usefulness when
standardized. Containerization can be a valuable asset to a
nation at war, as well as at peace, but it has its drawbacks-
as well
.
= - - : . I - : :
As certain ports draw more and more of the market away
from smaller, less frequented ports, containerization
becomes even more important. With containerization comes
the well designed loading facility, complete with dockside
cranes to move containers on or off the containerships.
Gone, for the most part, is the self-contained ship capable
of picking up or delivering its own cargo. Gone, too, is an
important feature of strategic sealift. A containership is
less useful for strategic sealift if it is too large to get
into possible "ports," if it cannot deliver its cargo
because the "port" has no cranes to lift containers, or if
the "port" doesn't have enough yard space to maneuver the
cargo for transport or transfer.
MSC is seeking to avoid some of these potential problems
by buying breakbulk ships for the RRF and by buying and
prepositioning crane ships in areas where they can do the
most good. Meanwhile, MSC is still looking for ways to
handle a container once it has gotten to its port of
debarkation: will the container be unpacked at the port or
moved to its final destination? Also, possible forms of
land transportation are being studied. [Ref. l:p. 30]
23
In the meantime, DOD cargo moves by containership
whenever possible, because containers offer additional
security to the cargo. Equipment too bulky to fit standard
containers can be shipped in special seasheds or on
flatracks that fit into containerships.
As the U.S. merchant fleet continues to grow in this
direction, some part of its usefulness to strategic sealift
is lost. MSC can purchase breakbulk ships for standby
purposes, but the U.S. merchant fleet is the mainstay of our
readiness program because it can respond quickly when
called, while the ships in the RRF still require a five to
ten day preparation period before they are ready to deploy.
The biggest problem with the newest containerships is their
size, for the newer ships are even larger in order to
achieve economies of scale. Conceivably, in the event that
some of these huge containerships are required for strategic
sealift, they would not be able to get close enough to a
port to unload, even were the ship self-contained or a crane
ship available.
24
V. THE CHANGING NATURE OF PORTS
A. DISAPPEARING HINTERLANDS
U.S. hinterlands, the areas surrounding and/or relying
on specific seaports for movement of goods essential to
their economies, are undergoing rapid alteration due to
recent changes in the U.S. economy. Not only is the U.S.
industrial base changing, but industries are also relocating
and the U.S. pattern of foreign trade has shifted. Pacific
Basin trade is growing while European trade declines. In
addition, the U.S. is importing more finished goods and
exporting fewer. All of these changes affect the ports
handling the cargo as well as the methods. Containeriza-
tion, combined with deregulation, has resulted in a whole
new concept of logistics planning, and destroyed the old
concept of "natural" hinterlands. [Ref. 6]
Traditionally, whether traffic management in a company
was decentralized or centralized, the typical approach to
import/export distribution focused on minimizing inland
transportation expenses [Ref. 6]. This helped to promote
the concept of "natural" hinterlands, since companies
routinely shipped their goods to the closest seaport. With
deregulation, however, and the parallel growth of
containerization, efficiency and greater economies of scale
could be achieved by carefully selecting seaports offering
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more frequent sailings, speedier handling, direct routing,
and/or other features which would allow the company to
minimize total transit times, and thus mifiimize its totar
costs. - This logistics concept, freely employed, is~causing
"natural" hinterlands to cease to exist in most parts af the^
country. [Ref. 6]
B. INTERMODALITY '-
Intermodality, the prime feature of containerization,
has done much to help create the "superport" image. At one
time land cargo moved quickly to the nearest seaport to take
best advantage of "FOB-U.S. port" rates for land
transportation was costly. Containerization, however,
provided the means for the vendor to participate in
negotiated money saving ocean shipping rates. Containers
offer protection to goods unequaled by other modes: the
items are containerized at the beginning of their voyage and
unpacked only at their final destination. There is less
chance for damage due to handling or loss, due to pilferage.
With transportation companies able to shift a container by
truck, rail, or ship, there is every advantage to shipping
most goods by container.
Containerization allows the greatest use of intermodal
transportation, and has helped create "superports.
"
Superports are ports with a great many transportation
links, like the "hub and spoke" concept employed by many
large airlines. The port can offer better rates than can
26
other older or less developed ports because it moves high
volumes of goods , and because it has '-- the latest in
transportation technology ( containerization) . The superport
rates often include land transportation, supplied ; by its
"feeder" transportation networks. The customer: is no longer
bound to use the nearest port; now he can ship to more
distant ports while saving transportation fees and even
getting his stock to his buyers faster than if he used the
closer, but not so active port. [Ref. 6]
Intermodality has created a "mini-land bridge as a
cooperative effort between rail and ocean carriers, allowing
both to serve markets previously served by an all water
route" [Ref. 6:p. 388]. As containerships grow larger, only
the largest and best equipped ports can handle the larger
draft ships and immense cargoes; smaller ports, and those
not capable of the land bridge link will lose out to the
newer, linked superports.
C. DEREGULATION
Deregulation allows rates to be set by negotiation and
competition. Inland carriers working with ocean carriers
create transportation systems that improve efficiency and
allow them to compete intermodally:
Point to point rates and through service proved to be a
lucrative marketing device for many ocean/inland carrier
combinations. It simplified the traffic managers [sic]
problem while allowing the carriers to enter new markets.
Pricing freedom, service contracts, load centers, etc.,
opened the gates to carrier competition on a scale never
before heard of in the U.S. trades. As this competition
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heated up, the old market territory of the port quickly
disappeared. [Ref. 6: p. 388]
Once the hinterlands supporting them dried up, smaller,




The size of ports which handle containerized cargo is
dependent on the water depth needed to accommodate ships and
on the staging areas needed to support the shiploads of
containers. Port size also depends on the other modes of
transportation terminating at the port to move the
containers inland. Since containerized ports require much
more area than breakbulk ports, older ports with no room to
expand find themselves replaced by newer, more spacious
ports: Oakland replaced San Francisco while the port of New
York expanded into northern New Jersey.
E. PROBLEM AREAS
The port expansion due to containerization and
deregulation presents a new problem to strategic sealift.
Basically, a port exists to transfer goods from land to sea
and vice versa. Fewer ports enable the enemy to be more
successful at cutting supply lines. Since the ports best
equipped to handle containerized vessels (the major portion
of the U.S. merchant fleet) are the so-called superports,
loss of them would make it very difficult to move containers
rapidly. Some smaller ports would be unable to berth large
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container vessels, as well as load/unload them without
assistance. If not mined, blockaded, or destroyed, however,
superports represent one of the best links in our national
transportation system. i - .
But the cost of these superports in terms of other lost
ports is high: government shipping relies on the same ports
as does private shipping. During wartime these ports will
be unable to meet all demands. Also, some smaller ports
will be unable to contend with very large vessels, forcing
those vessels to remain at anchor away from the port (like
current supertankers) while smaller vessels and craneships
work to bring the cargo into (or out of) port, possibly
during enemy action. While small RRF breakbulkers could use
smaller ports in wartime, leaving the superports to the
larger containerships, there is still a problem in that
deteriorated, outmoded smaller ports will be less able to
handle the shipping necessary to support the military
effort. A strong sealift strategy will provide for
alternate ports in wartime as well as in peacetime.
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VI. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
A. BACKGROUND - "-.-:::>.-
-.Shipbuilding is both a capital and a labor-intensive
industry, and one that is cyclical with fluctuating demand.
It is an important economic and defense asset. Unfortunate-
ly, however, shipbuilding in the United States seems to be
in decline, with private yards closing or ceasing construc-
tion for lack of non-government contracts. Naval shipyards,
originally created for repair and overhaul, ^re now doing
more new construction, leaving private yards with even less
to do. MARAD reported that in calendar year 1983, only 12
of the 654 ships completed worldwide were constructed in the
United States. In FY84, eight new commercial ships were
delivered [Ref. 4:p. 4], Construction differential subsi-
dies (CDS), once paid to encourage U.S. -flag ship operators
to "buy American," have been cut to help ease national
budget deficits. Thus there is little incentive to support
the ailing U.S. shipbuilding industry by procuring new ships
from it.
American shipyards are capable of building almost any
type of ship, and modern techniques such as modular
construction make it possible for even the oldest of yards
to participate. However, shipbuilding is costly, and
because "runs" of ships are not done continuously, it is
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even more costly. Foreign shipyards typically keep their
costs down by doing continuous runs of ships of one design.
[Ref. 2]
In 1984 a Shipyard Mobilization Base (SYMBA) study
identified 119 shipyards in the United States with potential
national security value. Nine shipyards were government
owned, and 110 were in the private sector. The Active
Shipbuilding Industrial Base (ASIB) includes 23 major
shipyards that account for almost one half of the total
shipyard employment in the United States.
Since 1982, the base date for the SYMBA study, 16
shipyards in the shipyard mobilization base have closed,
either permanently or temporarily, while only one has been
added. Four of these closures were in the ASIB. [Ref.
2:p. 71]
There is no doubt the U.S. shipbuilding industry is
ailing, but it cannot get better on defense contracts alone
[Ref. 2]. In fact, any further decline in the number of
shipyards might affect the competitive base required for
award of government contracts. Private sector purchases
alone would help revitalize the industry.
B. LABOR
Labor is one of the main reasons for difficulties in the
shipbuilding industry. Labor costs are high, yet the number
of available jobs declines, forcing the cost of labor even
higher as skilled labor seeks employment elsewhere. Because
unions dominate the shipyard labor force, technological
changes must be negotiated, costing both time and money:
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The U.S. shipyard industry is over 90 percent unionized.
Avondale Shipyard is the one exception among the ASIB
yards. The shipbuilding unions are characteristically
craft unions, and, consequently, multiunion yards are the
industry norm. Their influence has been considered
largely prejudicial to maximizing productivity: the craft
orientation has produced numerous demarcation disputes.
More important, it prevents flexible use of labor, compli-
cates planning and scheduling, and discourages career
changes. [Ref. 7: pp. 104-105]
Add to this a high turnover rate and instability of employ-
ment in the industry [Ref. 4] and it is easy to see why
labor is a force to be recognized as important to the
industry's health.
C. SEALIFT IMPLICATIONS
A strong industrial base is an important part of strate-
gic sealift. It seems, however, that not only is the U.S.
merchant fleet declining but so is its shipbuilding
industry. Either one could prove fatal, but the combination
of the two can only make things more difficult.
As important as the material support of the operating
fleet in peacetime is, the most important characteristic
of naval shipyards is their mobilization potential. World
War II mobilization illustrates what mobilization require-
ments may be in the extreme: total shipyard employment
increased tenfold between mid-1940 and the employment peak
in 1943. However, a World War II mobilization experience
is not envisioned in current plans. Present estimates are
that a shortfall of 4 0,000 workers would exist at D day,
with an additional 55,000 workers needed to reach a
projected peak a year and a half after D day. This
scenario assumes a global situation lasting about three
years. It includes a buildup in both naval and private
shipyards. [Ref. 2:p. 84]
MSC, recognizing the need to close this gap in military
support capability, is attempting to replace old ships in
the NDRF with more modern vessels. It is also modifying
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containerships to allow them to carry oversized military
equipment, and adding other features designed to enhance
sealift capability. Finally, it is converting two tankers
into hospital ships for the RRF. MSC cannot force commer-
cial lines to utilize private shipyards, but its own
programs to enhance strategic sealift assets can also help
spur an already flagging industry. [Ref. 1]
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VII. DECREASING U.S. MERCHANT FLEET
A. U.S. MERCHANT FLEET - - -..- : :
The U.S. merchant fleet is slowly shrinking in number-
although new ships do replace old. This occurs because as
older breakbulk ships are scrapped, they are replaced by
newer, larger containerships. The newer ships, because they
carry more cargo, often replace more than one retiring ship.
Similarly, larger tankers replace more than one of the
smaller, older variety. In addition, losses of U.S.
government subsidies to U.S. merchant marine ships and their
owners cause companies to purchase their vessels from
foreign shipyards instead of American yards. Since most of
the U.S. merchant fleet falls under the Jones Act (192 0)
which requires that vessels engaged in domestic trade be
built in domestic yards, and since subsidies are no longer
available, this means there are no incentives to build in
U.S. shipyards, and hence more losses to the U.S. merchant
fleet. As construction and labor costs increase, forcing
owners to buy foreign ships and crews, the U.S. merchant
fleet decreases in size.
B. EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROL FLEET
The Effective U.S. Control Fleet (EUSC) consists of
those ships owned by domestic sources but registered under
other national flags. While there are agreements between
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ship owners and the U.S. government and treaties between the
U.S. government and foreign governments making these ships
available to the U.S. in times of national emergency, there
is always some question of whether these agreements and
treaties would be upheld. The size of this fleet is
comparable to the U.S. -flag fleet, but its total tonnage is
much greater. In 1983, the total tonnage of the EUSC was
more than twice the U.S. -flag fleet, with 85 percent of the
tonnage in tankers and most of the remainder in dry-bulk and
combination-bulk carriers [Ref. 7:p. 58]. The EUSC, like
the U.S. -flag merchant force, is steadily shrinking as its
older vessels are replaced with fewer larger, more efficient
vessels. While MSC may be able to call upon EUSC vessels to
augment forces obtained from U.S. -flag merchant sources, the
smaller available supply and the uncertainty of promised
availability makes this source somewhat unreliable.
C. FLAG OF CONVENIENCE
Flag of Convenience is a term used to describe the
registration and operation of ships outside the owner's
country. Generally these foreign countries have easier
registration requirements and minimum taxes and regulations.
Also, there is usually no requirement for the crew's
nationality or a limitation on where the vessel may be
built. Since flying the U.S. flag requires that the vessel
be built in a U.S. shipyard and be crewed by an American
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crew [Ref. 2], many owners take advantage of the flag of
convenience to compete more economically in the world
market. As American labor and production costs go up,
however, the cost of maintaining a U.S. -flag fleet also goes
up. Without government intervention in the form of
subsidies or fewer requirements concerning ship origin or
crew nationality, a U.S. -flag fleet may become impossible to
maintain. MSC may call on ships flying flags of convenience
(the EUSC fleet covered under treaty) in times of national
emergency, but their availability is open to question.
Moreover, since this fleet is mostly composed of tankers and
bulk vessels it is not as useful a source for a strategy
requiring vessels more along the lines of self-contained
breakbulk or RO/RO vessels.
D. AGE OF THE MERCHANT FLEET
The U.S. -flag fleet is an aging one. A significant
portion (59%) of the 1983 total fleet was 15 years old or
older. This included 91% of the breakbulk/partial container
vessels and 61% of the tankers for that year. In these two
categories, replacements are usually not made on a one-for-
one basis as the new vessels tend to be larger. In
addition, the breakbulk ships tend to be replaced by
container ships, which also means that pierside cranes or
crane ships are then needed to assist in the
loading/unloading. These containerships also may not be in
the best interests of strategic sealift, although they may
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help the economic survival of the merchant fleet on a
commercial basis.
MSC has a double problem with an aging fleet: it must
rely on the U.S. -flag fleet for support in national
emergency, and it must rely on an NDRF whose assets may be
even less capable. To combat this problem, MSC is trying to
update the NDRF with the strategically required self-
contained breakbulk ships and by adding high-speed converted
containerships to the RRF. Also, MSC supports the merchant
fleet by shipping all but certain military items on
commercial U.S. lines. [Ref. 1]
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VIII. DEREGULATION
Ao BACKGROUND - :
Regulation of transportation modes began as^ ^ means of
controlling "monopolies" and large carriers and for ensuring
that smaller businesses had a chance to compete. It also
helped ensure that "captive" customers would pay a fair
price for services received. As time went on and
alternative transportation modes increased, regulation
helped balance the market share between the modes, ensuring
the survival of each. And regulation helped promote the
national interest, too, by including subsidies or penalties
to force market participants to change behavior.
The shipping industry is governed by a host of regula-
tions, some related to shipping itself and some related to
other connected industries or other transportation modes.
Regulations governing ports and waterways, pollution
control, customs fees, etc., also affect the shipping
industry. Many regulations exist specifically to aid
shipping. Subsidies and other forms of aid also support the
industry.
With the coming of deregulation in recent years, whole
new concepts of transportation are emerging. Competition is
now at its keenest, and companies are fighting to establish
themselves in markets previously prohibited to them. The
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effects of deregulation in the other transportation modes
are now beginning to affect ocean shipping and the merchant
fleet.
B. DEREGULATION
The Shipping Act of 1984 and the resulting deregulation
in rail shipping made possible world transportation service,
for a company could now ship to the port of its choice
instead of to the nearest port. The ocean shipping lines
were free to negotiate with land transportation lines so
they could offer package deals which included land
transportation at much lower rates than was previously
possible. This benefited the ocean lines since they
required more cargo for their newer, larger containerships,
and benefited the ports since they received more traffic
which required the pierside cranes needed to service the
containerships. At least one company (CSX) also took
advantage of deregulation in all modes by creating a company
with vehicles in all modes. That company can boast service
potential that others can only approximate. [Ref. 5]
The new cooperation between modes encouraged by deregu-
lation offers strategic sealift benefits as well as
problems. If deregulation aided the growth of fewer, but
larger "superports, " it also created a stronger climate for
inter-modal growth. Containers that can be pulled by truck,
hauled by train, or shipped by ocean vessel offer more
possibilities for use than items that fit one system only.
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While this growth in the use of containers currently
presents handling problems for MSC, containerization will
eventually be one of the mainstays of defense strategy. In
addition, deregulation, by creating mini-bridge (seaport to
seaport land transportation) and micro-bridge (inland city
to seaport land transportation) situations actually speeds
up transfer of goods. This is always a welcome event,
especially during national emergencies. Mini-bridge and
micro-bridge shipments also help develop and strengthen
transportation network ties which could benefit MSC in the
event of the loss of a seaport.
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IX. A-7 6 LEGISLATION
A. BACKGROUND
0MB Circular A-76 reiterates the policy that the federal
government uses, not creates, business enterprises. Any
service that can be performed by commercial sources should
not be performed by government offices. This legislation
calls for each activity or command to review its functions
for possible contracting out. Functions identified as
commercial activities (CA) are costed out and compared to
contractor bids from private industry. The CA is then
awarded to the lowest bid. If the CA remains in-house the
government continues to perform the function. If the CA is
contracted out, however, the civilian positions with the
government are eliminated and the contractor takes over
performance of the function. Performance review ensures the
contractor's cooperation and work completion, and in the
event of inadequate performance, can result in return of the
CA function to government operation. [Ref.2]
B. APPLICATIONS
MSC complies with A-76 legislation as much as possible.
MSC's Annual Report for 1984 [Ref. l:p. 34] listed "several
categories of point-to-point and special mission ships,
including the four oceanographic research and nine ocean
surveying ships," as CA ventures that were contracted out.
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There are also plans to study the possibility of contracting
out other special mission ships such a& missile range
instriimentation ships, navigation test support ships, and
underseas surveillance ships. The newly converted hospital
ships may also have their medical staff- provided fey
contract
.
Since mission essential work is exempt from A-76
legislation, MSC can only look at its non-mission essential
operations. Obviously there is a very fine line between
these categories in MSC's case: just when a special mission
ship becomes essential is hard to determine. In any case,
there is a limited pool of mariners available for either the
Civil Service or the contractor to draw from. Contracted
out services always leave open the question of possible
strikes, in addition to problems with security.
A-76 has created some problems for shipyards. While
shipyards may not be under MSC • s control these problems do
affect the possible readiness of its fleet. The case has
been made that naval shipyards could be contracted out in a
piecemeal fashion under this legislation [Ref. 2:p. 86].
Since the naval shipyards are the ones doing the majority of
work in an already dying industry, this could have a severe
impact on strategic seal ift in the long run.
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X. PREPOSITIONED SHIPS AND FSS
A. PREPOSITIONED SHIPS ;:-.- f . ?-. 5. i ^
Prepositioning equipment and supplies provides
flexibility and readiness to strategic sealift. Since
prepositioning equipment and supplies generally requires the
cooperation of a host nation, prepositioning at sea would
negate any politically related problems and also allow for
easy movement of material from place to place to meet
different threats. The Near Term Prepositioning Force
(NTPF) and its replacement, the Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPS) program, established dedicated sealift and
prepositioning at sea in a region without mainland staging
sites for military units. [Ref. 1]
With the NTPF, the U.S. can deploy troops and sustain
them in the field for up to 3 days. In a crisis situation,
troops are airlifted to the operational theater and join
their prepositioned supplies and equipment aboard the
prepositioned ships which can then shift location as the
situation warrants.
When not activated, prepositioned ships remain on
station (docked or anchored with reduced crew) while crew
members are rotated periodically. The ships may also
participate in different readiness exercises. The equipment
and supplies on board are periodically rotated and checked
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to ensure proper working condition. The crew members are
civilian mariners, either employed by MSC as Civil Service
employees or by the contractor operating the ship for MSC.
This is a two-fold blessing for MSC: operational costs are
lower than operating with a full crew, and the existing pool
of civilian mariners has its skills honed. [Ref. 1]
B. SL-7 FAST SEALIFT SUPPORT
Fast Seal ift Support (FSS) is a concept closely aligned
to prepositioning fully loaded ships, except that FSS relies
on quick response time as its contribution to strategic
seal ift. FSS ships are berthed near the troops they
support, maintained by a contractor in a status that enables
them to be fully activated within 96 hours. These ships are
not operated in peacetime except for 3 days of training per
year, and have no full-time crews assigned. [Ref. 1]
The mainstay of the FSS program is the SL-7 class
containership. SL-7's can maintain a speed of 33 knots,
making them the fastest ships in the U.S. merchant fleet.
But their great speed is a two-edged sword: they are also
huge consumers of precious fuel. In crisis, however, the
ability to lend fast support far outweighs the cost of the
fuel required, and their size allows them to haul much
oversized and heavy equipment. Converted to RO/RO vessels
with some remaining container capacity, SL-7's are extremely
versatile additions to the RRF. With the SL-7's it has
placed in the RRF, and the prepositioned ships it has placed
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on station, MSC has given strategic sealift greater
flexibility than was previously possible, and has greatly




Any mobilization facing our country will involve
sealift, for it is the best method available to us for
transporting the huge quantities of equipment and material
required. Prepositioning ships and material relieves,
somewhat, the immediate need for transporting necessary
items to the area of conflict, but it does not eliminate the
need for continuing support. The recent provision of fast
support ships to be held ready for mobilization will help
supply that need. Any other support will have to come from
the ships in the mothball fleet, which, however, are no
longer particularly suitable for service in a world of
totally different technology. Alternatives to correct this
situation include buying existing working vessels for the
MSC fleet, and building ships for the reserve fleet.
B. ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Acquiring sealift, prepositioning, and ready reserve
ships in an era of tight budgets has brought about some new
methods of acquisition management. Some ships needed for
sealift are now contracted for, as opposed to being
purchased. However, this method has problems since our own
merchant fleet is gradually shrinking in number, resulting
in a lessening available pool of needed ship types. The
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pool may grow if laws requiring U.S. flag ships to be built
in the U.S. and manned by U.S. citizens are changed.
Another method of ensuring adequate ship availability,
that of government building of ships for lease, requires
huge outlays of cash and still cannot guarantee enough ships
because there are so few U.S. shipyards and they are so
expensive that they are almost exclusively engaged in the
manufacture of military vessels. Moreover, their work
schedules seem to be so chronically delayed that time alone
makes construction of merchant ships even more unlikely.
Another factor, the changing configuration of the U.S.
merchant fleet, makes it even more difficult for the Navy to
contract ships even for seal ift needs.
When containerization revolutionized the shipping
industry, it also encouraged growth in size of
containerships as well as reducing their self-supportabili-
ty. Huge containerships lacking their own cranes for off-
loading are not very useful for military purposes when
small, undeveloped port areas are projected as the likely
places these ships will call under hostile conditions.
Moreover, military equipment often does not fit properly
into containers, and so this creates still another problem
to overcome. The final solution, at least for now, has been
construction and conversion of ships specifically to meet
the needs of a prepositioned force that meets military
requirements and provides adequate speed for transit. In
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all this, however, keeping down costs is a major
consideration.
C. FUNDING
Getting funding for MSC projects is oftentimes diffi-
cult. Monies granted do not match monies requested. For
example, in FY83,
The Navy requested $322,600,000 for the conversion of four
T-AKRX Fast Logistics Ships (SL-7s) . In conformance with
previous Committee direction with respect to the Fast
Logistic Ship Program, the Committee recommends
$44,000,000 to procure the long lead material for the
remaining four T-AKRX ships. The Committee's recommenda-
tion represents a reduction of $278,600,000 from the
budget request. [Ref. 8: p. 21]
Such cuts, especially if continued, can severely cripple MSC
programs, as well as overall Navy growth and maintenance.
To avoid such situations, great emphasis is placed on compe-
tition as a means of achieving cost savings throughout the
acquisition process. Emphasis on competition also seems to
aid with time savings as well, a tremendous help in a period
of fiscal constraint and shaky industrial base. This compe-
tition is fostered by second sourcing programs and may also
be helping to keep the industrial base alive, for the
remaining shipyards have been making substantial investments
to improve their yards so as to win government contracts
[Ref. 9:p. 12]. Competition is used very well by MSC to
enhance the nation's strategic sealift capabilities:
During the fiscal years from 1982 through 1989, approxi-
mately $5.4 billion will be spent for new ship
construction and conversion under Navy Sealift programs.
At least eight different U.S. shipyards will share in this
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work, as will scores of component manufacturers and ship-
yard suppliers. During the same period, approximately
$13.4 billion will be paid to ship operators for the
operation and maintenance of seal ift ships for the Navy.
[Ref. l:p. 42]
MSC's success with competition makes it clear that it is
possible to survive even in an austere fiscal climate.
Moreover, such competition assures us that readiness is
possible, even where it formerly seemed difficult.
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XII. SUMMARY
A. STRATEGIC MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS -:--;..-
Strategic mobility is divided into three basic elements:
airlift, sealift, and prepositioning supplies and equipment.
MSC is responsible for sealift, and also plays a major role
in the prepositioning of ships and equipment. Although
MSC's primary mission is strategic sealift and the
prepositioning of ships and equipment, its everyday
functions are to provide sealift for DOD cargoes and to
support the U.S. Naval fleet. Through its programs, MSC
provides flexibility and increased readiness to strategic
mobility.
B. PROBLEMS FACING MSC
There are many problems facing MSC in its mission
accomplishment: it is a time of austere funding,
deregulation, high labor costs, and much union disagreement.
The U.S. shipbuilding industry is declining, as are the
numbers of the U.S. merchant fleet, which is also moving
from smaller, self-contained vessels to larger, non-self-
contained vessels. A-76 legislation is seeking to contract
out all sorts of commercial type activities, and ports are
growing larger with the intermodal capabilities obtainable
by containerization. The world shipping market is growing
more competitive, and overcapacity runs rampant in the
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industry. Despite all these obstacles, MSC is maintaining
continual readiness while providing the most flexible
strategic sealift possible.
C. MSC SOLUTIONS
In the face of so many obstacles, MSC has prepared a few
countermeasures to deal most effectively with its multiple
problem areas. Prime among these is updating the NDRF by
the addition of breakbulk ships, crane ships, and SL-7's to
the RRF. This gives an aging "fleet" some much-needed
sealift capability as well as speed for second-wave wartime
shipping. Of equal importance is the new MPS program, which
extends both readiness and sealift capability. Careful
pursuit of competitive contracts in both shipbuilding and
conversion projects as well as in charters helps keep
related maritime industries functioning, and cuts government
costs as well. Developing and using sea sheds and flat
racks allows MSC to make use of containerships for shipping
military cargoes.
All of these measures, with their many smaller
components, serve to accomplish MSC's mission of strategic
sealift, providing it with increased flexibility and a
stronger readiness posture. Strategic sealift under MSC's
new tactics better approaches the intent of the national
strategy toward surge capability and sustainability in
fighting a war. These tactics also enable MSC to better
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control its assets and emphasize the potential military
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Lighter Aboard Ship
Liquefied Natural Gas (carrier)
Military Airlift Command
Maritime Administration
Mobile Logistic Support Force
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•^Vessels maintained for emergency activation under the
fleet preservation program
115 9 25 149
55 103 158
74 5 79
244 9 133 386
Source: [Ref. 4:p. 38]
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APPENDIX D









Liberia 2,019 4 131,545,000 1
Greece 2,454 3 68,612,000 2
Japan 1,712 5 61,191,000 3
Panama 3,290 1 57,781,000 4
Norway- 529 11 32,470,000 5
United Kingdom 685 7 27,251,000 6
U.S.S.R. 2,497 2 23,157,000 7
United States
(Privately owned) 538 10 21,569,000 8
France 314 20 16,532,000 9
Italy 601 8 14,964,000 10
China (People's
Republic of) 861 6 12,628,000 11
Singapore 556 9 11,634,000 12
Spain 511 12 10,765,000 13
Korea (Republic
of) 499 13 10,585,000 14





^Ocean going merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
^By no. of ships, Cyprus ranked 14th—with 480 vessels
aggregating 8,110,000 dwt, and Netherlands ranked 15th
—
with 448 vessels aggregating 7,040,000 dwt.
^Includes 250 United States Government-owned ships of
2,840,000 dwt.
Source: [Ref. 4:p. 12]
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APPENDIX E




Vessel No. DWT No. DWT No . DWT




Cargo 5 43 4 32 9 75
General Cargo 49 731 5 32 54 763
Intermodal 116 2,671 116 2,671
Bulk Carriers 22 999 22 999
Tankers 205 11,930 2 21 207 11,951




Cargo 1 6 24 187 25 193
General Cargo 20 251 194 2,174 214 2,325
Intermodal 29 545 5 83 34 628
Bulk Carriers 3 122 3 122
Tankers 51 3,823 14 315 65 4,138





Cargo 6 49 28 219 34 268
General Cargo 69 982 199 2,206 268 3,188
Intermodal 145 3,216 5 83 150 3,299
Bulk Carriers 25 1,121 25 1,121
Tankers 256 15,753 16 336 272 16,089
Total
American
Flag 501 21,121 248^ 2,844 749 23,965
(Continued)
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^Vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over, excluding privately
owned tugs, barges, etc.
^Bulk carriers including tug barges; Tankers including
tanker barges and liquified natural gas carriers.
•^Includes 6 vessels in custody of other agencies. ^
^Includes National Defense Reserve Fleet which consists ' "
of 228 ships, of which 8 are scrap candidates; 2 vessels
are in baseboat charter.
Note: Tonnage figures may not add due to rounding.
Source: [Ref. 4: p. 10]
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APPENDIX H
MARITIME WORKFORCE AVERAGE MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT
FY 83 FY 84














^Commercial yards in the Active Shipbuilding Base,
constructing new ships and/or seeking new
construction orders
Source: [Ref. 4:p. 36]
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APPENDIX I
SHIPYARDS IN THE ACTIVE SHIPBUILDING
INDUSTRIAL BASE (AS IB)
1985
Shipyard
























































1975 1980 % of change Labor Material
United States $5.47 8.59 57 57% 52%
Japan 3.57 5.76 61 26 29
West Germany 4.34 8.26 90 38 23
Netherlands 4.21 7.43 76 37 89
Sweden 5.62 7.81 39 41 55
United
Kingdom 3.12 5.86 88 81 48
Source: [Ref. 7:p. 105]
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APPENDIX K











Charleston 8,601 145 251 8,350
Long Beach 6,895 400 1,295 5,600
Mare Island 10,028 150 328 9,700
Norfolk 13,327 250 1,027 12,300
Pearl Harbor 6,778 550 628 6,150
Philadelphia 11,373 512 1,113 10,260
Portsmouth 8,528 225 228 8,300
Puget Sound 12,387 200 687 11,700
TOTAL 77,917 2,432 5,557 72,360
Source: [Ref. 2:p. 87]
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APPENDIX L
























































Source: [Ref. 7:p. 58]
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APPENDIX M

























^Oceangoing ships 1,000 gross tons and over
Source: [Ref. 7:p. 58]
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APPENDIX N
AGE DISTRIBUTION U.S. -FLAG PRIVATELY OWNED FLEET
1 JAN 83
Total Under 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24
25 yrs
and
Ships 5 vrs yrs vrs vrs vrs Over
Total all
ships 541 59 72 81 70 93 161
General
Cargo 240 24 18 48 56 54 40
Breakbulk/
partial
container 104 1 1 7 45 47 3
Container-
ship 97 19 3 32 9 7 37
RO/RO 18 2 8 6 2
Barge
carriers 21 2 6 13
Bulk Cargo 18 4 3 2 1 8
Tankers 233 17 44 28 11 37 96
Special
products/
LNG 33 11 7 3 1 2 9
Other
(coastal.
passenger) 17 3 2 4 8
Source: [Ref. 7:p. 58]
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